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IN THE SUPREME CO,URT
O,F THE STATE OF UTAH
BEEHIVE STATE BANK,
a corporation,
P laintif /-Respondent,
vs.
DEON ROSQUIST, GERALDINE
ROSQUIST, and ILA R. PAINTER, Individuals, and CARPETS,
INC., a corporation,
Defenda.nts,
FIRST SECURITY BANK 0 F
UTAH, N.A., a corporation,
Garnishee,

Case No.

11951

FRED L. PAINTER,
Intervener-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Respondent respectfully petitions this Court for a
rPhearing in the above entitled case. This petition is
based upon the following grounds:
1

POINT I
APPELLANT IS CONCLUSIVELY BOUND BY THE
WRITTEN AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE JOINT
BANK ACCOUNT.
POINT II
THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR HAD AN INTEREST IN
AND A RIGHT TO THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF THE
JOINT BANK ACCOUNT.
POINT III
ALL EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR A DETERMINATION IN THIS CASE HAS BEEN PRODUCED IN
THE LOWER COURT.

WHEREFORE, Respondent prays that a rehearing
be granted and that the judgment of the lower court be
affirmed in all respects.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Robert M. Anderson
Stephen D. Swindle
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING
POINT I
APPELLANT IS CONCLUSIVELY BOUND BY THE
WRITTEN AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE JOINT
BANK ACCOUNT.

This is the second appeal of this case to this Court.
On the first appeal, this Court ordered the case remanded
for the taking of evidence and held that the interest of
Ila R. Painter in and to the fund while she was alive
should be applied toward the satisfaction of plaintiff's
judgment against her. The pertinent language of this
Court's opinion is as follows :

"It seems to us that what all of the recent
cases in U tab have been trying to say is this:
"If the contract between the parties ostensibly creates a joint tenancy relationship with
full right of survivorship, there arises a presumption that such is the case unless and
until some interested party shows under
equitable rules that the contract should be reformed to show some other agreement of the
parties or that the contract is not enforceable
because of fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other
infirmity.
"We hold that the law is as above indicated.
"We are of the opinion that this case cannot
be settled by a summary judgment based upon the
undi spnted evidence now before the court. The
interest of Ila R. Painter in and to the fund while
she was alive, if any she had, should be applied
toward the satisfaction of the appellant's judgment against her.
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"The judgment of the trial court is, therefore
reversed with directions to proceed in accordanc;
with this opinion. The appellant is entitled to its
costs." Beehive State Bank v. Rosquist, 21 Utah·
2d 17, 21-22, 439 P.2d 468, 471 (1968).
There was no attempt by the appellant at the trial
of this case upon remand to show under equitable rules
that the joint account should be reformed to show some
other agrement of the parties, nor was evidence presented
to indicate that the contract is not enforceable because of
fraud, mistake, incapacity or other infirmity. (See Record at 178-85).
The lower court, in conformity with the evidence presented, found that the joint account was valid and enforceable at the time of service of the garnishment and
that it was the only agreement of the parties relating to
the joint account. (Record at 134-35). Upon remand after
the first appeal in this case, the lower trial court made '
the following Amended Findings of Fact:
"3. There was no other agreement between
Ila R. Painter and her husband, Fred L. Painter,
intervenor, relating to the joint bank acccount with .
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., except the joint
account contract executed by said Ila R. and Fred
L. Painter.
"4. Ila R. Painter was the joint owner of the
funds placed in the joint account and was entitled
to withdraw the full total of the deposits from
said joint account and there was no evidence presented to show that the intervenor was the sole
owner of the funds in the said joint account nor
was there any evidence which would modify
vary the terms of the said joint account contract.
4

Since Ila R. Painter, pursuant to the terms of the
written contract, had a right to all of the funds in the
joint account, the lower court logically held that Beehive
State Bank acquired a right to all the funds in the joint
account.
This Court has further clarified the holding of Beehive State Bank v. Rosquist, supra, in the case of Continental Bank and Trust Company v. Kimball, 21 Utah
2d 152, 442 P.2d 472 (1968). In that case, this Court
held that the appellant was conclusively bound by the
written contract. This Court stated as follows:
"Since the appellant is not trying to reform
the contract and is not claiming fraud, mistake,
incapacity, or other infirmity, we think that it is
concliisively bound by the contract as made and
cannot show that the parties intended a result contrary to that which the law of joint tenancy relationship imposes. Id. at 154, 442 P.2d at 474.
(Emphasis added.)
This holding was further cited in Hobbs v. Fenton,
..... Utah 2d ______ , 479 P.2d 472 (1971).
A written instrument may be reformed if, by accident, inadvertence, mistake, fraud or inequitable conduct, the instrument fails to express the intention of the
parties. In the absence of satisfactory proof of accident,
frand, or mistake, there is no basis for a court of equity
to reform an instrument, 45 Am. Jur. Reformation of
Instruments §45 (1943). Appellant makes no attempt
under such equitable rules to reform the written contract,
nor does he claim fraud, mistake, incapacity or other
infirmity to render the contract unenforcea ble.
1
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The only evidence offered by appellant during the
trial in this case was to the effect that the funds in the
account came from appellant exclusively, that appellant's
wife could write checks on the account but did not, that
the account was for the payment of household expenses,
and that appellant's wife had a cash allowance for her
own use. (Record at 178-85). Appellant tries to show
from this evidence that there was necessarily an intention
to give his wife only a survivorship interest in the account. (Brief of Appellant at 11.) Without attempting
to reform the written contract by equitable rules and
without a showing of unenforceability, appellant is foreclosed from showing that he and/or his wife intended a
result contrary to the explicit terms of the written agreement which conferred a present and undivided interest
in appellant's wife. See Andrus v. Blaz.za.rd, 23 Utah 233,
254, 63 Pac. 888, 892-93 (1901).

POINT II
THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR HAD AN INTEREST IN
AND A RIGHT TO THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF THE
JOINT BANK ACCOUNT.

In the prior appeal of this case, this Court stated
that "the interest of Ila R. Painter in and to the fund
while she was alive, if any she had, should be applied
toward the satisfaction of the appellant's judgment
.
. t . 9)
against her." Beehive State Bank v. Rosquis , supra,•
Utah 2d at 22, 439 P.2d at 471.
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Because the written contract governing the joint
account in this case provided that Ila R. Painter was the
joint owner of the funds and was entitled to withdraw the
full total of the deposits from said account (Exhibit 1-P;
Record at 134), the trial court held that Ila R. Painter's
interest extended to the entire amount in the joint account at the time of respondent's garnishment. (Record
at 135).
The lower court's ruling is proper and in accordance
with the terms of the joint account. Appellant and his
wife each had complete and absolute authority over the
funds in the joint account pursuant to the contract. By
the terms of the contract, appellant gave his wife the
right to pay any or all of her judgment debtors to the
extent of the total funds in the account. Because appellant's wife could have paid her creditors from the account, judicially enforced payment by way of garnishment
to the full extent of the amount in the account should
be permitted and indeed be mandatory. Any other ruling
would enhance the likelihood of defrauding creditors and
would ignore the literal terms of the contract. In addition, any judgment for less than the full amount in the
account would effectively create a non-statutory exemption from garnishment for persons using joint accounts.
Those who enjoy the convenience of joint accounts and
who confer a total interest in the fund upon both tenants
jointly, should be held to the responsibilities that arise
from this legal relationship. Pa,rk Enterprises, Inc. v.
Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 47 N.W. 2d 194 (1951); Empire
Fertilizers, Ltd. v. Cioci, 4 D.L.R. 804 (1934).
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Since appellant and his wife created a valid and
binding contract, one by which they were both
and one which has not been reformed to show some other
agreement of the parties, they must accept all of the legal
relationships that flow therefrom.
The fact that appellant contributed the funds in the
joint account is not of controlling significance concerning
Ila R. Painter's interest in and to the joint bank account.
The written agreement set forth in the signature card
accurately recited the intention of the parties when they
created the account and evidence of the source or use
of funds is not sufficient to infer a contrary result.
POINT III
ALL EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR A DETERMINATION IN THIS CASE HAS BEEN PRODUCED IN
THE LOWER COURT.

Appellant has had his trial on the merits of his claim
for intervention. The signature card governing the joint
account ·was introduced and according to that agreement
appellant and his wife agreed with each other that they
owned the funds jointly and that either could write a
check for the total amount in the account. A presumption
arose at the time the contract was entered into that it
was valid and accurntely set forth the intention of the
parties. Under those cases decided by this Court both
before and after the first appeal, appellant had the bur·
den of showing some other intention of the parties by
clear and convincing evidence or by proving that the
contract ·was unenforceable.
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The only documentary evidence offered by appellant
concerned the source of the funds in the account. His
own oral testimony only showed that the account was for
household expenses, that his wife could write checks
on the account but did not, and that his wife had a cash
allowance separate from the joint account. There was no
direct evidence of the intention of the parties other than
the written agreement. None of the evidence adduced was
inconsistent with the recitals in the written
account agreement. Evidence by a joint tenant concerning
the source of the funds or the depositor's intention merely
to create a survivorship interest is not of controlling
significance nor does it defeat the presumption of the
written agreement. Haywood v. Gill, 16 Utah 2d 299, 302,
400 P.2d 16, 18 (1965); Neill v. Royce, 101Utah181, 189,
120 P.2d 327, 331 (1941). Even if appellant had testified
concerning his and his wife's intentions when the account
was created, such evidence would be hardly clear and
convincing in light of the obvious financial interest of
the witness and the lack of any other probative evidence
on the issue of intent. See Neill v. Royce, supra, 101 Utah
at 189, 120 P.2d at 331. There was no evidence whatsoever
of fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity.
The lower court ruled that the joint account contract
was the only agreement between appellant and his wife
and that it was valid and enforceable. The appellant
simply did not overcome the presumption of the validity
of the written agreement during the course of the trial
in the lower court. Appellant has had his day in court and
has had an opportunity to introduce any evidence in order
9

to overcome the presumption of validity of the joint
account agreement. The evidence introduced did not
overcome the presumption of the written agreement. The
respondent is, therefore, entitled to the entire amount of
the joint account. For this Court to reach a diffferent
result would lead to the inevitable defrauding of credit
ors. To remand this case for a further hearing would only
prolong this matter since all evidence necessary for a
determination of this matter was produced in the lower
court.
We respectfully submit that a rehearing of this case
should be granted.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Robert M. Anderson and
Stephen D. Swindle
Suite 300 141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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